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Comment
Ordinary Business Terms: Setting the Standard
for 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C)
I. INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Code' permits a bankrupt estate to recover certain
transfers made by its debtor prior to declaring bankruptcy. The trustee
of a bankrupt estate obtains this power under the law of avoidable
preferences. 2 Deciding which transfers are avoidable and which are
exempt from the trustee's avoidance powers requires solving an
evidentiary question that is currently causing confusion among several
courts. 3 Although the Code defines eight exceptions to the general
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 [hereinafter 1994 Bankruptcy
Reform Act]. The modem Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted as the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The law relating to bankruptcy
is codified and enacted as Title 11 of the United State Code, which is entitled
"Bankruptcy." Although Title 11 does not specify a short title for its provisions, this
Comment refers to these enactments as the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code."
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). The trustee of the bankrupt estate has "avoidance"
or "preference" powers as enumerated in § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which states:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by
the provision of this title.
Id.
Simply stated, a preference is a transfer by an insolvent debtor to one or more creditors
whereby the creditor to whom the property was transferred is put in a better position
than other creditors with respect to priority claims to the assets of the insolvent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (6th ed. 1990); see also Note, Preferential Transfers and
the Value of the Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE L.J. 1449 (1978) (analyzing the relationship
between insolvency and preference law).
3. See infra part III.
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preference rules,4 it fails to define clearly the circumstances under
which the exceptions apply. One of these exceptions, known as the
ordinary-course-of-business defense,5 has recently inspired litigation
focusing on the meaning of section 547(c)(2)(C)'s statutory language.
Pursuant to section 547(c)(2)(C), the third and last element of the
ordinary-course-of-business exception, a trustee may not avoid a
transfer if the payment was made "according to ordinary business
terms." 6 Courts and commentators currently disagree on what evidence a creditor must introduce to prove that the payment terms of the
preferential transfer were "ordinary business terms" under section
547(c)(2)(C). Clarification of this subsection's language is vitally
needed by creditors8 who are understandably concerned with protecting their credit transactions from a trustee's avoidance power9
should a debtor file bankruptcy. In short, creditors need to know
precisely what "ordinary business terms" are in order to conform their
business dealings to the appropriate standard.'0 Currently, such
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)-(8) (1988), as amended by 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act,
supra note 1, § 304(f), 108 Stat. 4106, 4133-34. Following the introductory language
in § 547(c), which states that a trustee cannot avoid certain transfers under § 547(b), the
statute provides eight numbered paragraphs setting forth the exceptions to the trustee's
avoidance power. Id. If creditors can qualify under any one or more of these exceptions,
then payments they received from the debtor during the preference period are protected to
that extent from the trustee's avoidance power as set forth in § 547(b). See id.
5. Id. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988). The ordinary-course:-of-business exception consists
of the following three statutory elements:
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor
and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.
Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, by proving each of the elements under § 547(c)(2), a creditor protects a
transaction that would otherwise be subject to the trustee's avoidance. See id.
Throughout this Comment, the phrase "ordinary-course-of-business exception" is used
interchangeably with the "ordinary-course-of-business defense" or with § 547(c)(2).
6. Id. § 547(c)(2)(C).
7. See, e.g., In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing split in the circuits on this issue and stating that even the scholarly
literature is inconclusive).
8. In this Comment, "creditor" is used to signify the person or entity claiming to be
owed, and "debtor" is used to signify a person or entity owing a debt or obligation prior
to a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. Once bankruptcy proceedings
begin, the "bankrupt" will be used to signify the former debtor.
9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The burden of proving the unavoidability of a transfer is on the creditor or party in interest who is defending the action. 11
U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988).
10. Creditors deserve guidance on how to create payment terms that will not fall prey
to the trustee's avoidance power. More specifically, creditors seek clarification of what

1995]

Setting the Standard for 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C)

475

business planning is virtually impossible due to recent court decisions
imposing inconsistent evidentiary burdens under section 547(c)(2)(C)
on creditors facing adversary proceedings."
These decisions also reveal that courts need clarification on the
evidentiary requirements of section 547(c)(2)(C). 2 Courts have
lamented Congress' failure to flesh out the concept of "ordinary" under
this section of the Code.' 3 Like creditors, courts inconsistently determine whether the phrase "ordinary business terms" refers to what is
ordinary between the particular debtor and creditor at issue, between
debtors,
that debtor and other creditors, between that creditor and other
14
or generally between any debtor and creditor in the industry.
15
This Comment highlights the difficulties courts and commentators
face when interpreting section 547(c)(2)(C). First, it briefly traces the
legislative history of the original Bankruptcy Act of 189816 to current
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 highlighting the statutory
changes that lend guidance to the correct interpretation of section
evidence they must produce in order to exempt a payment under the ordinary-course-ofbusiness exception. See infra part III.
11. See infra part III. An adversary proceeding is an action by the trustee against a
creditor to recover an avoidable transfer. I1 U.S.C. § 550 (1988) (as amended by 1994
Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 1, § 202, 108 Stat. 4106, 4121).
12. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 219, 221 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing the district court for not
refining the contours of § 547(c)(2)(C) and stating that the question of what is meant by
"ordinary business terms" is of great importance).
13. See, e.g., Campbell v. Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co., Inc.), 37 B.R.
914, 921-22 (D.S.C. 1983) (noting that even the legislative history provides no
guidance as to the meaning of § 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary business terms").
14. See infra part III.
15. See Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of
Section 547(c)(1), (2) & (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 692
(1983) (describing the ordinary-course-of-business terms requirement as "the most
opaque requirements to date").
Another commentator identified the problem in 1986. See David J. DeSimone,
Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of Business Exception
Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 AKRON L. REV. 95 (1986). According to DeSimone, "[t]he
big problem with section 547(c)(2)(C) is determining what the benchmark for the
objective standard should be. Business practice in general? Practices in a particular
industry? ... And, how does one define the industry? This could be a problem for the
courts." Id. at 127.
16. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter 1898 Act], repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter 1978 Reform Act], as amended
by 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 1.
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by 1994 Bankruptcy
Reform Act, supra note I (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549).
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547(c)(2)(C)."8 Next, this Comment explains how courts have historically interpreted section 547(c)(2)(C) under either a party-focused
or industry-terms analysis, 9 and discusses the inconsistency among
the circuits in choosing between the interpretations. 20 Furthermore,
this Comment analyzes whether a creditor must produce independent
evidence that the terms at issue comply with "industry terms"2 ' in
order to escape the trustee's avoidance powers.
In deciding these issues, this Comment promotes a view that is
consistent with the underlying objectives of preference law.2 2 Specifically, it urges courts to refrain from requiring positive evidence of
industry-term compliance unless the policy objectives of preference
law are not otherwise met.
Finally, this Comment encourages
Congress to end the controversy by providing official comments to
clarify the evidentiary requirements of "ordinary business terms. 24
II. BACKGROUND

Preference law governs relationships among creditors even before
bankruptcy proceedings begin, by deterring self-interested behavior of
certain creditors during the transitional period between a debtor's
insolvency and bankruptcy.25 More specifically, preference law requires the return of payments made as a result of self-interested
creditor behavior to the bankrupt estate so that the remaining creditors

18. See infra part II.
19. See infra part II.D.
20. See infra part ll.
21. See infra part IV. Although courts historically considered this to be the minority
view, one court recently and more logically dubbed this as the view of the "new
majority." See In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1109, 1114 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992).
Furthermore, a thorough analysis of the § 547(c)(2)(C) issue may require more than
merely choosing one of the two prevailing interpretations. For instance, Tolona has
added another dimension to the analysis by using the minority, or "new majority"
approach while lowering the threshold of evidence needed to show term compliance with
the industry standard. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir.
1993). Using this watered-down standard, the court required "industry terms" evidence
under § 547(c)(2)(C) but accepted evidence of "general business terms" as sufficient
proof of the standard. Id.
22. See infra parts IV-VI. If a creditor acts consistently with the purposes of
preference law, this author argues against imposing further evidentiary hurdles.
23. See infra part V.
24. See infra part V.
25. John S. Cullina, RecharacterizingInsider Preferences as Fraudulent Conveyances:
A Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1991) (stating
that "[p]reference law regulates distributional fights between creditors ....
); see supra
note 2 (citing and explaining 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988)).
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may eventually receive a larger share of the estate. 26 Accordingly, the
trustee of the bankrupt estate, armed with section 547(b), 27 may avoid
any transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor (1) made to or for the
benefit of a creditor,28 (2) made on account of an antecedent debt,29 (3)
made while the debtor is insolvent,30 (4) made to an insider on or
within ninety days before a debtor files the bankruptcy petition,31 or
(5) which enables the creditor to receive more than it would receive
under bankruptcy liquidation.32 As one court described, such
avoidance power under preference law is necessary to protect both the
debtor and the creditor and to prevent situations such as the following:
If there were no rule against preferences, an insolvent debtor,
teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and besieged by creditors,
might have an incentive to buy off the most importunate of his
creditors, necessarily at the expense (the debtor being insolvent)
of other creditors, in the hope of keeping afloat a little longer.
Knowing that the debtor might do such a thing, an unsecured
creditor who sensed that a debtor might be about to go belly-up
would have a strong incentive to petition him into bankruptcy so
that the debtor could not deplete the assets available to pay this
creditor by paying another unsecured creditor instead.33
Nevertheless, eight exceptions or affirmative defenses to section
547(b) allow creditors to defeat a trustee's avoidance actions in certain
circumstances.34 In effect, these exceptions encourage creditors to
26. See Cullina, supra note 25, at 153.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988); see supra note 2.
28. Id. § 547(b)(1).
29. Id. § 547(b)(2).
30. Id. § 547(b)(3). The Code defines a firm as insolvent when "the sum of such
entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation .... " Id.
§ 101(32)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the preference provisions, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the 90 days immediately
preceding the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. Id. § 547(t). This 90-day period is
commonly known as the preference period. See id. Once a creditor rebuts this
presumption, the burden shifts to the trustee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the debtor was indeed insolvent at the time of the allegedly preferential transfer.
See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.21, at 547-93 to -94 (15th ed. 1993).
3 1. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A)-(B) (1988). If the creditor was an insider at the time of
the transfer, a trustee may avoid any transfer made between 90 days and one year before
the date the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
32. Id. § 547(b)(5)(A)-(C).
Trustees have long enjoyed the power to avoid
preferential transfers. See generally Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 718-50 (1985) (tracing the evolution
of the American concept of preferential transfers). For a detailed history of preference
power, see Lissa L. Broome, Payments on Long-term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The
Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, 79.
33. In re Xonics Imaging, Inc., 837 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1988).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l)-(8) (1988), as amended by 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act,
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continue doing business with struggling debtors." The exception set
out in section 547(c)(2) requires 36
proving three distinct elements found
in subsections (A), (B), and (C).
This exception, the ordinary-course-of-business exception,"
prevents the trustee from avoiding a debtor's pre-bankruptcy preferential transfer3 8 if the payment was made and the debt was incurred
in the ordinary course of business between the debtor and that
creditor, 39 and if the payment was made according to "ordinary business terms." Although most courts currently have little difficulty in
interpreting the evidentiary burdens imposed by the first two elements,
subsection (C) causes much confusion."
Courts and commentators have argued that without the exceptions
listed in section 547(c), creditors would either stop extending credit all
together, insist on early repayment, or force debtors into early bankruptcy at the first hint of financial hardship.42 Such creditor action
would disserve societal interests by precipitating premature bankruptcy
that more tolerant debtor-creditor relationships could prevent.43
supra note 1,§ 304(f), 108 Stat. 4106, 4133-34.
35. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods, Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 1994). The Molded court opined that "the
ordinary course exception to the preference rule is formulated to induce creditors to
continue dealing with a distressed debtor so as to kindle its chances of survival without a
costly detour through, or a humbling ending in, the sticky web of bankruptcy." Id.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(C) (1988).
37. Id. § 547(c)(2).
38. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(B). For the exact text of these statutory elements, see
supra note 5. See also supra note 27-32 and accompanying text.
40. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C). See supra note 5 which sets forth the statutory
elements.
41. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 1993). The
Tolona court explained:
The first two requirements are easy to understand: of course to defeat the
inference of preferential treatment the debt must have been incurred in the
ordinary course of business of both debtor and creditor and the payment on
account of the debt must have been in the ordinary course as well. But what
does the third requirement-that the payment have been "made according to
ordinary business terms"-add?
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) (1988)).
While courts have resolved most issues pertaining to the first two elements of
§ 547(c)(2), any remaining litigation relating to these elements is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
42. See, e.g., Remes v. ASC Meat Imports, Ltd. (In re Morren Meat & Poultry Co.),
92 B.R. 737, 740 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("'Without these exceptions creditors would be
reluctant to conduct business with a struggling enterprise ....

' (quoting O'Neil v.

Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984))).
43. See Tolona, 3 F.3d at 1032. Judge Posner insightfully noted:
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A. General Policy Objectives of Preference Law
The legislative history of the Code and pre-Code bankruptcy rules'
confirms that there are at least two policy objectives of preference law.
These include (1) deterring unusual credit transactions or the "race of
diligence, 45 and (2) preserving the bankrupt estate to ensure equality
of distribution among creditors. 4
1. Deterring the Race of Diligence
Congress' goal of deterring the "race of diligence" by preventing
unusual credit transactions somewhat reflects traditional freedom of
contract principles. As early as the late 1500s,English bankruptcy law
Unless the favoring of particular creditors is outlawed, the mass of creditors of
a shaky firm will be nervous, fearing that one or a few of their number are
going to walk away with all the firm's assets; and this fear may precipitate
debtors into bankruptcy earlier than is socially desirable.
Id.
By insulating normal business transactions, § 547(c)(2) attempts to allay the
concerns of would-be nervous creditors by creating a safe harbor for financial dealings.
Morren Meat, 92 B.R. at 740. As a result of this repose from aggressive creditor action,
debtors have an increased opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. Id.
44. Pre-Code bankruptcy law includes English common law, American common law,
and the 1898 Act. See infra part II.A. I.
45. This Comment uses the term "race of diligence" as short-hand to describe unusual
and undesirable creditor behavior such as insisting on early repayment or instituting
aggressive collection actions at the first sight of financial hardship. As noted by one
commentator:
The race of diligence harms the creditors as a group primarily because it is
likely to bring about the dismemberment of the debtor business. Once
bankruptcy is filed, the unpaid creditors must look to the remaining assets of
the debtor business to satisfy their claims. Because a piecemeal sale of a
dismembered business typically generates less value than its sale as a going
concern, the race of diligence reduces the total assets available to the creditors
as a group.
A. Ari Afilalo, The Impact of Union Bank v. Wolas on the Ordinary Course of Business
Defense to a Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 72 B.U. L. REV. 625, 627 (1992).
46. Afilalo, supra note 45, at 627 (stating that "Congress specifically intended the
preferences section of the Bankruptcy Code to deter this 'race of diligence' and to
promote equality of distribution among creditors."); DeSimone, supra note 15, at 98
(describing equality of distribution as the most fundamental concept underlying
bankruptcy and acknowledging that discouraging the race of diligence is another goal of
preference law); see Herbert, supra note 15, at 696 (stating that "[tihe usual rationales
for the law of preferences are to avoid dismemberment of the debtor and to ensure
equality of distribution."); see also Broome, supra note 32, at 113 (describing the
principal objective of the preference provision as being facilitation of equality of
distribution among creditors of the debtor); Issac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference
Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAW.
175, 180 (1985) (stating that "[b]ankruptcy policy seeks to ensure the creditors of a
ratable share of the assets owned by the debtor" and commenting that the preference laws
are designed to protect this goal).
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upheld transfers so long as they were made for good consideration and
according to "bona-fide" contract terms.47 Subsequent English
bankruptcy laws, focusing on the debtor's intent," were then incorporated in modified form in American common law and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. 49
Under the 1898 Act, a trustee seeking to avoid a debtor's payment
carried the burden of proving that the creditor had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent when making the payment.50
This evidentiary requirement demonstrated Congress' reluctance,
absent a creditor's fraud or a lack of good faith, to interfere with business transactions much the way that early English courts refused to
avoid payments because of strict adherence to freedom of contract
principles.5 In essence, Congress sought to deter only those creditors
with knowledge of the debtor's financial problems from advantageously insisting on repayment to the detriment of those remaining
creditors without such knowledge or advantage.52

47. Countryman, supra note 32, at 714-15 (discussing English law's focus on
freedom of contract in the 1500s). Thus, in the absence of proof of criminal conduct or
fraud, freedom of contract preserved most transfers. Id.
48. See David A. Ontko, Comment, Ordinary Business Terms Must Not be Ignored:
The Forgotten but Critical Role of § 547(c)(2)(C) in the Ordinary Course of Business
Exception to the Preference Rules, 6 BANKR. DEVS. J. 429, 431 (1989) (discussing the
change of focus in early English bankruptcy law). Although strict enforcement of
contract rights was an underlying principle of the first English bankruptcy laws,
English courts later analyzed bankruptcy law in terms of preferential transfers and
equitable distribution of the bankrupt estate. Id. Under English bankruptcy law, the
trustee was required to prove the debtor's intent to give a preference in order to avoid the
transfer. Id. at 431-32.
49. 1898 Act, supra note 16; see Ontko, supra note 48, at 431-32 (discussing
preference law developments from the English system to this country's current
approach). The Supreme Court recently looked to English law when deciding whether a
bankruptcy court may conduct a jury trial in GrandfinancieraS.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33, 43-47 (1989). Noting that bankruptcy suits were proceedings "at law" in England,
the Court held that the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee likewise applied to
bankruptcy suits in the United States. Id. at 46-49.
50. 1898 Act, supra note 16, § 60(b). Although English law and American law focus
on the intent of different parties, Ontko asserts that they are consistent in protecting the
majority of normal business transactions since the intent element is difficult to prove.
See Ontko, supra note 48, at 431-32.
5 1. See Countryman, supra note 32, at 714-15; supra text accompanying note 47.
52. This statement assumes that creditors who know a debtor is in financial trouble
will try to maximize their recovery, to the detriment of other creditors, by racing to
enforce their claims and perhaps precipitating an early bankruptcy. Afilalo, supra note
45, at 626-27 (discussing how self-interested creditor behavior runs counter to societal
interests). Preventing such action keeps money in the estate allowing all creditors to
share equally in a larger portion of the estate if bankruptcy inevitably results. Id.
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Thus, Congress sought to deter a race of diligence or a race to the
courthouse.53 Indeed, the 1898 Act treated creditors favorably as a
class since only those transfers to a small class of "knowledgeable"
creditors were subject to preference attacks.54 Because the trustee
carried the burden of proving the creditor's knowledge, creditors were
not burdened by evidentiary requirements and were able to protect
most of their transactions from the trustee's avoidance powers.55
2. Seeking Equality of Distribution
The presumption in favor of creditors disappeared in 1978 when
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code.5 6 The Code expanded the
objectives of preference law by focusing on preventing transfers that,
in effect, infringed upon equality of distribution of the bankrupt
estate." Under the 1978 Reform Act,58 Congress enacted preference
provisions that eliminated the 1898 Act's reasonable-cause-to-believe
requirement 59 due to intense criticisms that this intent-focused analysis
placed too much of an evidentiary burden on the trustee and that
frequent failures to prove the requisite intent deterred equality of
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138-39
(describing the trustee's power to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers as a deterrent to
creditors who compete to dismember a debtor); supra note 43.
54. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
55. See Ontko, supra note 48, at 432 (noting that routine payments for such expenses
as rent, inventory, or supplies were usually protected since trustees could rarely prove
that such trade creditors had the requisite reasonable-cause-to-believe the debtor was
insolvent). Ontko also discusses how, prior to the 1978 Amendments, such expenses
were commonly excepted from preference attacks under a judicial doctrine known as the
"Current Expense Rule." Id.; see also In re Brenton's Cove Dev. Co., 52 B.R. 287
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1985). The court in Brenton noted that "[u]nlike the amended statute,
former § 547(c)(2) included a 45-day rule which was virtually always dispositive,
because unless the transfer occurred within 45 days after the debt was incurred, there was
Id. at
no need to consider whether payment was in the ordinary course of business ....
292 n.7.
56. 1978 Reform Act, supra note 16. In 1978, after years of study and debate,
Congress completely overhauled the federal bankruptcy system. Through the 1978
Reform Act, Congress enacted a Bankruptcy Code to replace the 1898 Act. Id. Several
provisions of the 1978 Reform Act were again recently amended in the 1994 Bankruptcy
Reform Act, supra note 1. These recent amendments do not solve the problems on which
this Comment focuses.
57. See 1978 Reform Act, supra note 16. Thus, in 1978 the Code favored trustees by
not requiring them to show that any particular creditor was intentionally trying to
obtain more than his share. Id. "Whereas transfers previously had been presumed to be
legitimate in the absence of a specific showing of bad faith, transfers under the [1978]
Code were presumed improper unless deemed 'normal' and 'not unusual' within the
ordinary course of business." Ontko, supra note 48, at 434.
58. See 1978 Reform Act, supra note 16.
59. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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distribution.W
The newly enacted Code created a presumption of insolvency during
the ninety days preceding the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy
petition. 6' This presumption relieved the trustee of the burden of
proving either the debtor's insolvency or the creditor's knowledge of
the insolvency at the time of the preferential transfer. Consequently,
a creditor could no longer rely on or exploit the safe harbor protection
informally established under the 1898 Act by the trustee's frequent
inability to show the requisite intent and knowledge. The avoidance
provisions in the 1978 Reform Act essentially widened the scope of
avoidable transfers, and, indeed, represented a new trend in augmenting the trustee's power to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers.6 3
This new trend arguably indicated that Congress was no longer
primarily concerned with whether creditors advantageously exerted
payment pressure by engaging in a race of diligence. Rather, Congress now seemed to focus on ensuring that equality of distribution
existed among all creditors, whether or not they used unfair creditor
pressure. 64 Under a strict equality of distribution policy, the trustee
held augmented power to avoid pre-bankruptcy transfers even for
general expenses such as payments for rent, inventory, or supplies.65
Thus, creditors faced virtually insurmountable evidentiary burdens
stemming from the trustee's increased power to avoid any transfer that
resulted in an unequal estate distribution. 66
Perhaps in recognition of the new Code's harshness toward
creditors, Congress enacted section 547(c)(2), which, in 1978, con-

tained seven exceptions to the trustee's avoidance power.6 7 The

legislative history accompanying these exceptions demonstrates that
60. See, e.g., Ontko, supra note 48, at 433. Arguably, the 1898 Act did not treat all
creditors equally since it often allowed a preferred creditor to receive more than an
unpreferred creditor. See id. This inequality resulted from the trustee's frequent inability
to avoid preferential transfers for lack of proof of the creditor's knowledge about the
debtor's financial state. See id.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1988); see Broome, supra note 32, at 96 n.91 (discussing the
hardship trustees faced, prior to the 1978 Reform Act, in attempting to prove the debtor
was insolvent in the 90 days prior to filing bankruptcy).
62. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b); see Ontko, supra note 48, at 433 (stating that this statutory
change essentially transformed preference law into a strict liability statute).
64. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96. "These statutory requirements meant that a
trustee could avoid any payment .... " Id.
65. See id. at 96 n.92.
66. See id.
67. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)-(7). In 1994, Congress added an eighth exception
for support or alimony payments for a former spouse or child. See 1994 Bankruptcy
Reform Act, supra note 1, § 304(f), 108 Stat. 4106, 4133-34.
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Congress was aware of the creditors' plights resulting from statutory
changes based solely on the equality of distribution policy. 68 Specifically, Congress explained that section 547(c)(2) was designed to
"leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because it does not
detract from the general policy of the preference section to discourage
unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's
slide into bankruptcy. ' 69 Thus, by recognizing these exceptions to the
trustee's preference power, one of which is the ordinary-course-ofbusiness exception, 0 Congress preserved the race of diligence as an
important, and arguably the primary, policy underlying bankruptcy
preference law.
B. The Influence of PreferencePolicy on Statutory Changes
The ordinary-course-of-business exception, codified at section
547(c)(2), may constitute the "first statutory embodiment of the
general concept that pre-bankruptcy transfers by a debtor, not made
because of the debtor's ailing financial condition, should not be
avoidable by a trustee."' The early version of this exception focused
on timing.72 It allowed a creditor to retain any transfer received from a
debtor within forty-five days of the date it was incurred, provided that
the debtor made the payment in the ordinary course of business
between the debtor and the creditor, and according to ordinary business terms. 73 The forty-five day exemption, considered a normal trade
cycle by Congress, essentially precluded complete equality of distribution since a debtor's payments to creditors within the forty-five
day window were immune from a trustee's avoidance powers.74
68. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history behind the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979).
69. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988). The specific text of this affirmative defense is set
forth at supra note 5; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
7 1. Andrew N. Herbach, Bankruptcy Preferences: New Developments in the Ordinary
Course of Business Exception, Wis. B. BULL., Dec. 1987, at 25, 26.

72. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978) (repealed 1984). Prior to the 1984 amendments,
subparagraph (B) read as follows: "[M]ade not later than 45 days after such debt was
incurred." Id. The 1984 amendments struck this provision and redesignated
subparagraphs (C) and (D) as (B) and (C), respectively. See Bankruptcy and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c)-(d)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 377-78
[hereinafter BAFJA].
73. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1978) (repealed 1984).
74. This was true whether or not a creditor received proportionally more than likeclass creditors unfortunate enough to have been paid beyond the 45-day cut-off period.
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In 1984, Congress enacted more changes to the Code. In this
effort, Congress considered but rejected several proposals calling for
the reinstatement of the reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement to
section 547(c)(2)." Under these proposals, debt payments not
meeting the forty-five day requirement would again receive protection
so long as the trustee failed to prove that the preferred creditor knew
the payment was intended as a preference payment over the rights of
other creditors.76 Instead of adopting these proposals, however,
Congress totally eliminated the forty-five day requirement." This
action was in direct response to lobbyist pressure by various trade
creditor groups with longer than forty-five day trade cycles.78 Some
Some commentators maintain that the 45-day rule was enacted to codify the judicially
recognized "current expense rule." See Broome, supra note 32, at 97 & n.95. Yet, it
should not be considered the statutory equivalent of the current expense rule since doing
so would preclude its application to long-term debt, which the Supreme Court found was
included within the ordinary course of business protection. See Union Bank v. Wolas,
502 U.S. 151, 160 (1991).
75. See Broome, supra note 32, at 107 & nn.131-33. The House and Senate
introduced several bills that included this intent element in 1981 through 1983. See
H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1983); H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11
(1983); H.R. 1085, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1983); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 211(a) (1983); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1982); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 10 (1981); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1981). For a brief discussion
of the reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 5052.
76. Broome, supra note 32, at 107. The Broome article provides a more complete
discussion of the litigation problems involving the 45-day rule. Id. Broome
summarizes proposals to resolve the perceived problems with automatically excluding
protection for transfers outside the 45-day period. Id. One proposal was to reinstate the
reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement in order to protect trade creditors with longer
than 45-day trade cycles, such as commercial paper issuers, and other creditors receiving
recurring debt payments, such as expenses for rent, inventory, and supplies. Id. Ontko
notes that trustees would face a tough burden in proving these trade creditors received a
monthly payment with knowledge of the debtor's financial problems. See Ontko, supra
note 48, at 432. Since receipt of these payments is regular, trustees would face a tough
burden in showing trade creditors received a payment with knowledge of the debtor's
insolvency. See id.
77. BAFJA, supra note 72, § 462(c)-(d)(1). Despite the sparse legislative history of
the 1984 amendments, some commentators contend that Congress rejected the
reasonable-cause-to-believe bills due to its reluctance to impose evidentiary burdens on
the trustee. See Afilalo, supra note 45, at 630-31; Ontko, supra note 48, at 433. Indeed,
legislative reports verify that Congress disfavored unworkable standards. See S. REP.
No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983) (noting that the 45-day limitation "places
undue burdens upon creditors .... ").
78. For example, several commercial paper and other trade creditor groups with
billing cycles beyond the 45-day period complained that they were unfairly excluded
from the protection of § 547(c)(2). See Broome, supra note 32, at 100. The elimination
of the 45-day rule would "relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of
45-days of the concern that repayment of such paper at maturity might be considered as
preferential transfers." Ontko, supra note 48, at 436 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S8897
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commentators suggest that Congress' refusal to reinstate the
reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement signified that Congress considered equality of distribution as the primary policy behind preference
law. 79 They further argue that Congress would have enacted the
reasonable-cause-to-believe proposals had it wished to promote the
concept of avoiding only those payments prompted by creditors
en8
gaging in the race of diligence through unusual creditor practice. 0
C. The Supreme Court's Viewpoint on Preference
Law Objectives
The Supreme Court eventually put an end to the speculation
concerning the primary policy underlying preference law. After Congress eliminated the timing element of section 547(c)(2), courts began
to focus on the meaning of "ordinary course of business" and on
Congress' purpose for enacting preference law. 8' In a decision
adopting a plain meaning interpretation of section 547(c)(2), the
Supreme Court, in Union Bank v. Wolas unequivocally refused to
subordinate the goal of deterring the race of diligence to that of
providing equality of distribution.
The Wolas Court overruled the pre-Wolas majority rule which
refused, as a matter of law, to apply section 547(c)(2) protection to

(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).
79. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96. Broome argues:
By eliminating the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement, Congress
deliberately shifted from a policy of avoiding only those preferential transfers
that were made to creditors who had reason to know of the debtor's insolvency
and may have therefore exerted pressure on the debtor, to a policy of
preserving equal distribution, even in the absence of creditor pressure.
Id. Further, Broome asserts that "[t]he most obvious indication that Congress did not
wish to return to a concept of avoiding only those payments that might be the result of
creditor pressures was its decision not to return to the 'reasonable cause to believe'
requirement as an element of a preferential transfer." Id. at 112. But see Afilalo, supra
note 45, at 653 (relying on Supreme Court authority to reject this argument).
80. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96.
8 1. See Afilalo, supra note 45, at 631 (discussing the controversy over whether
Congress intended "ordinary course of business" to include non-trade business such as
loans); see also Ontko, supra note 48, at 436 (discussing courts' shift in emphasis from
timing to the meaning of "ordinary" under § 547(c)(2)).
82. 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
83. Id. at 161. In Wolas, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re ZZZZ
Best Co., 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), which had held that payments on long-term
interest loans were outside the avoidance protection afforded by § 547(c)(2). Wolas,
502 U.S. at 162; see Afilalo, supra note 45, at 635 (stating that Wolas rejected any
arguments that Congress subordinated the deterrence policy when it refused to create a
reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement).
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preferential payments of interest and principal on long-term loans. 84
One commentator noted that circuits upholding the majority rule had
excluded loan payments from the scope of section 547(c)(2) because
protecting those payments would contravene the equality of distribution goal of preference law.85 Justice Stevens, writing for the
unanimous Wolas Court, however, emphatically stated that equality of
distribution is not the primary purpose of preference law.86 Wolas
confirmed that section 547(c)(2) aims ultimately at deterring the race of
diligence, 87 and further confirmed that equality of distribution would
incidentally occur once creditors returned preferential transfers to the
debtor's estate.88 Thus, by discouraging creditors from engaging in
the race of diligence, the Wolas Court arguably conceived that debtors
could work their way out of difficult financial situations through
cooperation with all of their creditors.89
The Wolas decision is also consistent with the House and Senate
Reports on section 547(c)(2). 90 The Court's assertion that deterring
the race of diligence is the primary policy of preference law follows the
House and Senate explanation that the goal behind providing exceptions to preference law is to "leave undisturbed normal financial
relations, because it does not detract from the general policy of the
preference section to discourage unusual action by either the debtor or
84. Wolas, 502 U.S. at 162; see Afilalo, supra note 45, at 631-32. "The [pre-Wolas]
majority rule construed the words 'ordinary course of business' to refer only to 'the
debtor's normal business operations of selling goods or providing services, not
borrowing money."' Id. (quoting Aquillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58
B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)).
85. See Afilalo, supra note 45, at 632-33.
86. Wolas, 502 U.S. at 161. "But the statutory text-which makes no distinction
between short-term debt and long-term debt-precludes an analysis that divorces the
policy favoring equal distribution from the policy of discouraging creditors from racing
to the courthouse to dismember the debtor." Id. at 162. Notably, this policy is the one
frequently relied upon by those courts imposing heightened evidentiary burdens under
§ 547(c)(2)(C), by requiring that creditors show their business terms comply with
industry terms. See infra part III.
87. See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 162 ("[E]ven if we accept the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the availability of the ordinary business exception to long-term
creditors does not directly further the policy of equal treatment, we must recognize that it
does further the policy of deterring the race to the courthouse ....");see also Afilalo,
supra note 45, at 635.
88. Wolas, 502 U.S. at 162 ("[A]s the House report recognized, [the ordinary
business exception to long-term creditors] may indirectly further the goal of equal
distribution as well."); see also Afilalo, supra note 45, at 635 (stating that "[s]ection
547(c)(2) ...achieves equality only insofar as it precludes creditors from retaining the
proceeds of the race of diligence.").
89. Afilalo, supra note 45, at 635.
90. See supra notes 68-69.

19951

Setting the Standard for 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C)

487

his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy."'" The
similarity between the Court's reasoning in Wolas and the legislative
history of section 547(c)(2), reveals that the Court, and arguably
Congress, both look to preference law primarily to prevent the race of
diligence. 92

The Supreme Court's current interpretive trend in other bankruptcy
cases is also relevant in predicting what evidentiary requirements the
Court would impose under section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary business
terms" requirement. 93 Because current bankruptcy law dates only to
1978, there are few Supreme Court decisions on bankruptcy issues.94
In those decisions, however, the Court has revealed itself as a textual
interpreter. 95 By narrowly relying on the plain meaning of statutory
language, the Court scrutinizes the text of statutes without scrutinizing
the consequences of its interpretation. 96
A recent example of the Court's textualism philosophy is demonstrated in Wolas where the Court refused to exclude long-term debt
from ordinary-course protection in the absence of such limiting
91. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329. Notably, this statement is the only
legislative comment on § 547(c)(2)(C). See Timothy J. Missling, Effect of a Subsequent
Bankruptcy on Construction Project Payments Issue: Is a Payment Made by a General
Contractor to its Subcontractor or Supplier, Before Going into Bankruptcy, Avoidable
as a PreferentialTransfer?, 11 CONST. L. 10. 14 n.81 (1991).
92. See supra notes 68-69, 86-88, and accompanying text; see also Afilalo, supra
note 45, at 635 (arguing that § 547(c)(2) aims not at achieving equality of distribution
but at deterring the race of diligence, and that equality of distribution comes only as a
necessary consequence of the change in behavior that § 547(c)(2) produces). Afilalo
contends that a court must find evidence indicating that a particular transfer was made in
furtherance of a race of diligence before § 547(c)(2) protection applies. Id. Similarly,
there appears to be a consensus among some courts and commentators on the purpose of
§ 547(c)(2)(C), which one commentator described as the protection of "recurring,
customary credit transactions that are incurred and paid in the ordinary course of business
of the debtor and the debtor's transferee." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.10, at 54748 (15th ed. 1993); see also In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 B.R. 269, 272 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1986) (asserting that several courts have stated that "Congress found in
Section 547(c)(2)(C) a means to protect normal financial relations between the debtor
and its creditors.").
93. Despite the split in the circuits, the Supreme Court has never addressed what
evidentiary requirement should be imposed under § 547(c)(2)(C).
94. Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 536-37 (1993). Rasmussen
also argues that due to resource constraints, the Court is more likely to grant certiorari
for cases dealing with constitutional issues rather than for bankruptcy cases. Id. Hence,
he asserts that bankruptcy cases are "some of the last cases put on the [Supreme Court's]
docket." Id. at 596.
95. Id. at 536-37.
96. Id.
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language in the statute. 97 Here, the Court's precise language is
relevant: "the text provides no support for [the trustee's] contention
that § 547(c)(2)'s coverage is limited to short-term debt. ' 98 In effect,
by narrowly interpreting the limits of the ordinary-course-of-business
exception, the Court restricted the trustee's avoidance power in such a
way that favors creditors as a class over trustees. 99 Because this result
is also supported by the Court's conclusion that deterrence of the race
of diligence is the primary policy of preference law,'0° the Court has
remained consistent in its action and reasoning.
D. Untimeliness as a Factorin JudicialInterpretationof
§ 547(c)(2)(C)'s "OrdinaryBusiness Terms'"
Despite the implicit congressional and explicit judicial acknowledgment that deterring unusual creditor behavior or the race of
diligence is a key policy behind the preference statute,'' there still
remains the question as to what is meant by "ordinary business terms."
Much of the litigation over the meaning of section 547(c)(2)(C)'s
"ordinary business terms" has developed in the context of late
payments received by trade creditors.'2 Courts presently disagree on
whether creditors must make a positive showing that the late payment
at issue was made according to "industry terms" in order to except the
payment from the trustee's avoidance power. 0 3 Although late payments seem inherently non-ordinary, some courts have ruled otherwise
where lateness was consistent with the manner and timing of prior
transfers between the parties.' °4 Other courts, however, have found
97. See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 155.
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of how the primary preference law policy of deterring the race of
diligence favors creditors, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
102. Compare Newton v. Andrews Distrib. Co. (In re White), 64 B.R. 843, 850
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), where payments made about two weeks late, which was not
unusual between the parties, fell within ordinary business terms with Ewald Bros., Inc.
v. Kraft, Inc. (In re Ewald Bros., Inc.), 45 B.R. 52, 57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), where
the court found payments made approximately eight or nine days late instead of only one
or two days late, like the parties' established practice, inconsistent with ordinary
business terms. Although this Comment focuses on defining ordinary business terms
with respect to late payments, the analysis suggests a method of determining the
avoidability of any payment made and received during the preference period. See infra

parts IV-V.
103. See, e.g., Hertzberg v. American Elec. Contractors (In re Steel Improvement
Co.), 79 B.R. 681 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (discussing thoroughly both sides of the
controversy).
104. See infra part II.D.1 (summarizing the party-focused or prior-dealings view).
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late payments ordinary only if they conform with the accepted manner
and timing of transfers within the relevant industry.'05
Actually, both views can cull support from the statutory language of
the Code. Notably, the first two elements of the ordinary-course-ofbusiness defense contain qualifying language restricting the exception's evidentiary scope to dealings between the "debtor and the
transferee."' 6 Conversely, section 547(c)(2)(C) does not explicitly
restrict the scope of the analysis to the parties. 0 7 Thus, many
authorities readily conclude that, in the absence of qualifying language,
subsection (C) necessitates that courts require independent, objective
proof of conformity to industry standards.'0 8 Conversely, others
argue that without language such as "according to ordinary business
terms in the industry," courts should analyze only the particular
parties' past dealings.'0 9
1. The Party-Focused View
Under the original majority or party-focused view, a court will
exclude late payments from preference attacks when their manner and
timing conform to the manner and timing of previous payments made
and accepted between the parties."o Thus, a creditor has no burden
under section 547(c)(2)(C) to introduce evidence that the payment
terms at issue conform to an industry standard."' Where the manner
105. See infra part II.D.2 (summarizing the industry-terms view).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1988). This qualifying language appears only
in subsections (A) and (B) of section 547(c)(2); see supra note 5 (quoting the exact text).
107. See id. § 547(c)(2)(C); see also supra note 5 (quoting the exact text).
108. See infra part II.D.2. Arguments such as this support the industry-terms view.
109. See infra part lI.D. 1. Arguments such as this support the party-focused or priordealings view.
110. See, e.g., Tolz v. Sunspa/Skinflicks (In re Sunup/Sundown, Inc.), 66 B.R. 1021
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); Newton v. Andrews Distrib. Co. (In re White), 64 B.R. 843
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); Newton v. Ed's Supply Co. (In re White), 58 B.R. 266
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); Carson v. Metzger Business Forms (In re Decor Noel Corp.),
65 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1985); Canfield v. Greensville Feed Mill of Emporia
(In re Ferguson), 41 B.R. 118 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); Carmack v. Zell (In re Mindy's
Inc.), 17 B.R. 177 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
Historically, courts considered this interpretation of § 547(c)(2)(C) to be the majority
view. E.g., Hertzberg v. American Elec. Contractors (In re Steel Improvement Co.), 79
B.R. 681, 683-84 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (categorizing the party-focused view as the
majority view and the industry-terms view as the minority view). Since many circuits
have recently rejected the party-focused view, however, its status as the majority view is
questionable. See infra note 115, parts II.D.2, III.B-E.
111. E.g., Estate of Rave Communications, Inc. v. The Ink Spot (In re Rave
Communications, Inc.), 128 B.R. 369, 372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (looking to prior
course of dealings between parties and contract terms to analyze § 547(c)(2)(C)
requirement); Sunup/Sundown, 66 B.R. at 1022-23 (finding ordinary-course protection
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and timing of the payments are inconsistent with the parties' prior
dealings, the ordinary-course-of-business exception does not apply
and recovery of the preferential transfer is granted." 2
It follows, therefore, that the parties cannot avail themselves of an
industry-accepted late payment policy when the debtor has consistently
paid on time. 113 Supporters of the party-focused view suggest that any
additional evidentiary requirement which requires proof of industryterms is overly burdensome and not necessary since the history of the
parties' past dealings sufficiently indicates whether the creditor has
exerted pressure on the struggling debtor to secure payment." 4
2. The Industry-Terms View
The industry-terms view imposes a different test in applying
subsection (C) of section 547(c)(2).' 5 This test asks whether the
manner and timing of the late payments conform to the general and
accepted methods of the parties' industry." 6 Supporters of this
industry-terms view argue that the party-focused view renders
subsection (C) a nullity or superfluous, since such a subjective analy-

by looking only at the parties' past practices and business records).
112. See, e.g., Commodity Exch. Servs. Co. v. Cotton Bd. (In re Commodity Exch.
Servs. Co.), 62 B.R. 868 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 67 B.R. 313 (N.D. Tex. 1986);
Ewald Bros., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc. (In re Ewald Bros., Inc.), 45 B.R. 52 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984).
113. In other words, where the debtor normally paid on time, a preferential late
payment would be avoidable even if it complied with industry standards. For instance,
where a debtor fails to make a payment within the time required by a contract between the
parties, this presumptively is non-ordinary if the debtor usually paid on time. Even if
the industry commonly accepted late payments, the trustee could avoid the transfer.
Thus, the original majority view or party-focused view is even-handed in not allowing
creditors to take advantage of industry terms when they suit the creditors' purpose.
114. See, e.g., Sunup/Sundown, 66 B.R. at 1023.
115. Many circuits have recently either adopted or slightly modified the industryterms view. See infra part III.B-E. Thus, one court recently identified the industry-terms
view as "the majority view today." In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1109, 1114 n.3
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the "minority" or industry-terms view may actually be the
majority view today). Despite Excello's support for the industry-terms or "new
majority" view, the Seventh Circuit acknowledges that such a standard is impractical in
certain circumstances. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods., Inc., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir.
1993) (admitting that deciding on the relevant industry standard can be a complex
process). To minimize the confusion caused by the terms "majority" or "minority"
view, the descriptive phrases "industry-focused view" and "party-focused view" will be
used throughout the remainder of this Comment.
116. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Whittaker (In re Alpex Computer Corp.), 60
B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am. (In
re Production Steel, Inc.), 54 B.R. 417 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); and Campbell v.
Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 B.R. 914 (D.S.C. 1983).
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7
sis is repetitious of the tests required in subsections (A) and (B)."
The industry-terms view finds further support in Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co.," 8 where the Supreme Court stated that any construction
of one part of a statute which renders another part redundant or
superfluous should be rejected." 9 Likewise, all parts of a statute
should, if possible, be given individual effect. 20 Thus, several courts
construing "ordinary business terms" argue for an interpretation which
gives independent meaning to all three requirements of section
a creditor to prove that the terms conform to an
547(c)(2), by requiring
121
standard.
industry
In effect, the industry-terms view, like any per se requirement,
increases the evidentiary burden on a creditor by requiring the creditor
to prove by independent evidence that its business terms are consistent
with industry terms. 122 For example, the creditor cannot establish an
ordinary-course-of-business defense without introducing testimony
that a payment received a certain number of days later would be
regularly accepted in the relevant industry. 23 Under the industryterms view, this would be the result even if the debtor had paid
24
according to the same terms during the parties' prior dealings.

Ill. DISCUSSION
The circuits have split in adopting either the party-focused view, the
industry-terms view, or some variant thereof. Furthermore, while the
following discussion reveals that the current trend is to adopt the
117. See Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239,
243-44 (6th Cir. 1992). The court stated:
In using the conjunctive "and" between subsections (B) and (C)-rather than
the disjunctive "or"-Congress clearly intended to establish separate,
discrete, and independent requirements which a creditor would have to fulfill to
prevent avoidance. . . . [T]o hold otherwise would not only ignore the clear
language of the statute, but would effectively render subsections (B) and (C)
superfluous to each other.
Id.
118. 367 U.S. 303 (1961).
119. Id. at 307-08.
120. Id.
121. E.g., Fred Hawes, 957 F.2d at 244. In other words, to interpret subsection (C)
independently from subsections (A) and (B) of § 547(c)(2), some courts contend that
subsection (C) requires a positive showing that the terms of the disputed transaction
comply with objective industry terms. See id.
122. See Hertzberg v. American Elec. Contractors (In re Steel Improvement Co.), 79
B.R. 681, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987). Steel Improvement is instructive in
describing the added evidentiary requirement imposed by courts adopting this view. Id.
123. See infra part IV.C.
124. See infra part IV.C.
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industry-terms view, 125 the circuits still disagree on what evidence
sufficiently meets the standard. 26 As a result, creditors have had little
direction in determining what constitutes "ordinary business terms."
A. Circuits With Ambiguous or Incomplete Answers
Some circuits have been incomplete or cursory in addressing the
issue of "ordinary business terms." For instance, although the First
Circuit in WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare, 127 stated that "ordinary business terms" refers to terms used
in the industry, this statement is mere dicta since the court did not
specifically address section 547(c)(2)(C)'s evidentiary requirements. 128 WJM instead held that the late payment at issue was outside
the ordinary-course-of-business exception because the payment was
not incurred, as required by subsection (B), in
the ordinary course of
129
business between the debtor and the creditor.
Similarly incomplete in addressing subsection (C)'s evidentiary
requirements, the Eleventh Circuit has simply concluded that late payments are categorically outside the meaning of section 547(c)(2)(C)'s
"ordinary business terms."' 30 In In re Craig Oil Company,'3' the court
opined that the ordinary-course-of-business defense was meant to
protect transactions traditionally protected by the "current expense
rule.' 32 It reasoned that since late payments are by definition not
current expense payments, they could not be made according to
"ordinary business terms.' 33 Thus, the court found no need to
125. See infra part III.B-E.
126. See infra part III.B-E.
127. 840 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1988).
128. Id. at 1010-11. Other courts have criticized the WJM court for not defining what
it meant when it called for an independent analysis of the business terms. See, e.g.,
Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc.),
18 F.3d 217, 219 n.l (3d Cir. 1994).
129. WJM, 840 F.2d at 1011.
130. Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (11th
Cir. 1986). This court does not clearly explain what specific evidence or lack thereof
was controlling. Instead, it simply found that the payment at issue was avoidable
because (1) it was made by a cashier's check instead of the usual corporate check and (2)
it was late. Id. at 1567-68.
131. Id. at 1563.
132. Id. at 1567. The court stated that the scope of the ordinary-course-of-business
exception is "necessarily limited to trade credit which is 'kept current' or other
transactions which are paid in full within the initial billing cycle." Id. The "current
expense rule" was a judicially recognized rule used to protect short-term trade credit
transactions under pre-1978 versions of the Code. See Ontko, supra note 48, at 432.
133. Craig Oil, 785 F.2d at 1567. The precise language of the court is as follows:
"Since the foundation of this provision is the similarity of trade credit and current
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discuss whether section 547(c)(2)(C) requires a creditor to show that
the terms at issue coincide with "industry terms" or with prior terms
agreed upon by the parties.'
B. Recent Rejection of the Majority or Party-FocusedView
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit does not deem all late
payments inherently unusual. Moreover, despite its early support for a
party-focused standard in defining "ordinary business terms," the
Eighth Circuit recently adopted the industry-terms view.
Originally, the Eighth Circuit indicated that "ordinary business
terms" should be defined according to prior dealings between the
parties.

3

In Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking,

36

the court held that

the payments at issue were made according to ordinary business terms
under section 547(c)(2)(C) "because the manner, form, and timing of
these payments were consistent with the practice both parties followed
previously.' 37 Nevertheless, despite this strong support for a partyof industry
focused analysis, the court equivocated that an evaluation
31
circumstances.
certain
in
necessary
be
terms may also
Recently, the Eighth Circuit attempted to clarify its Lovett holding in
In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, Inc. 13 9 In U.S.A.
expenses, . . . untimely payments are more likely to be considered outside the ordinary
course of business and avoidable as preferences." Id. at 1567-68.
134. Although Craig Oil held that late payments are categorically non-ordinary, it
essentially used the subjective approach in its examination of past business terms used
between the parties. See id. at 1566-67 (discussing the significance of the preferential
payment being made by a cashier's check when prior payments were made by corporate
check).
135. Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 498 (8th Cir. 1991). The
Lovett court stated that "'[l]ate payments may be held to be made in the ordinary course
of business, when such payment practices were well-established between the parties."'
Id. at 498 (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.10, at 547-51 (15th ed. 1990)).
136. Id. at 494.
137. Id. at 499. In Lovett, although it appeared that payments made to a creditor
came sooner during the 90-day preference period than during the preceding 12 months,
the difference in timing was not sufficiently significant to overcome the creditor's
evidence that the payments were according to "ordinary business terms." Id. The Lovett
appellate court reversed the bankruptcy and district courts' rulings that a payment made
within 90 days of filing a bankruptcy petition was not a payment made in the ordinary
course of business. Id.
138. See id. The following language demonstrates that the court was confused about
the evidentiary requirement imposed by § 547(c)(2)(C): "To the extent, if any, that
subsection (c)(2)(C) requires comparison between the payment record of the particular
debtor and the general practice in the industry regarding the time of payment, . . . [the
creditor's] testimony ... was sufficient to carry whatever burden [the creditor] may have
had on this issue." Id. (emphasis added).
139. Jones v. United Say. and Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Ark.,
Inc.), 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Inns, the bankruptcy court concluded that section 547(c)(2)(C) necessarily requires a separate, objective determination of whether payments
are ordinary in relation to industry standards.' 40 The district court
reversed,'41 stating that the bankruptcy court had applied the wrong
standard.' 42 The Eighth Circuit disagreed,' 43 and approving the bankruptcy court's analysis, ultimately required the creditor to prove that
the terms at issue coincided with industry terms.' 4 The court went on
to say that what constitutes "ordinary business terms" will vary among
industries. 4 Thus, the Eighth Circuit adopted the following standard
as its rule: "Subsection (c)(2)(C) does not require a creditor to
establish the existence of some uniform set of business terms within
the industry in order to satisfy its burden. It requires evidence of a
prevailing practice among similarly situated members of the industry
facing the same or similar problems." ' 46
C. Heightened EvidentiaryBurdens Under the
Industry-Terms View
Some circuits strictly equate section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary terms"
with an "industry terms" evidentiary requirement. The Ninth Circuit
strongly supports the industry-terms evidentiary requirement, without
regard for prior terms used between the parties. 47 In Loretto Winery,
the bankruptcy appellate panel for the Ninth Circuit considered the

140. Jones v. United Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Ark.,
Inc.), 151 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992), rev'd, 151 B.R. 492 (W.D. Ark 1993).
The bankruptcy court held that the creditor did not produce sufficient evidence of
compliance with industry terms and, thus, failed to satisfy the three elements of
§ 547(c)(2). Id. at 492.
141. Jones v. United Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Ark.,
Inc.), 151 B.R. 492, 498 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993), aff'd, 9 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 498. The district court interpreted Lovett as standing for the proposition
that independent evidence of compliance with industry terms is not required by
§ 547(c)(2)(C). See id.
143. U.S.A. Inns, 9 F.3d at 684. The court noted that the district court's interpretation was "at odds with the decisions of at least three other circuits that require an
independent, objective standard of the practices of the relevant industry be applied under
(c)(2)(C)." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 685.
146. Id. U.S.A. Inns credited the Seventh Circuit for first endorsing this
interpretation. Id. at 684 (discussing In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029,
1031 (7th Cir. 1993)).
147. See Mordy v. Chemcarb, Inc. (In re Food Catering & Hous., Inc.), 971 F.2d 396,
398 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring proof of "prevailing business standards"); Bell Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc. v. Andrew (In re Loretto Winery, Ltd.), 107 B.R. 707, 709 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1989).
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evidentiary requirements imposed by section 547(c)(2)(C).148 The
panel agreed with the trial court that subsection (C) necessarily
requires a creditor to show that the business terms at issue comply
with terms customarily used in the industry. 149 The court reasoned
that this industry-terms interpretation would avoid rendering subsection (C) a mere restatement
of the party-focused test described in
50
section 547(c)(2)(B).1
The Sixth Circuit also interprets section 547(c)(2)(C) as requiring
strict proof of industry-term compliance.' 5' According to In re Fred
Hawes Organization, Inc., 52 section 547(c)(2)(C) requires objective
proof that the payment is ordinary in relationship to prevailing industry
standards. 153 Specifically, the FredHawes court strictly required the
creditor to introduce independent evidence that the terms at issue
complied with industry terms, and not merely with terms used between
the creditor and other debtors. 54 Thus, the court found that the
148. Loretto, 107 B.R. at 709-10.
149. Id. at 709. In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit cited Loretto
approvingly in a decision finding that § 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary terms" meant
"industry terms." Unicorn Computer Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp. (In
re Unicorn Corp.), No. 92-17070, 1994 WL 134191, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 1994).
150. Loretto, 107 B.R. at 709-10. As stated by the court, "to graft upon the relevant
terms anything but an objective yardstick would either ignore the operative
nomenclature altogether, thereby making it a nullity, or interpret it in a manner which
duplicates the requirement of subparagraph (B), thereby making it superfluous." Id. at
709.
15 1. See Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp., (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239,
244 (6th Cir. 1992). This decision is inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's prior and
more lenient position taken in Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.),
872 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1989), where the court found that an examination of the parties'
past business terms sufficiently showed that the alleged preferential payment was made
according to "ordinary business terms." Id. at 743. Although the court acknowledged
that industry practices "might be relevant to the § 547(c)(2)(C) analysis," id. at 743 n.5,
Fulghum did not burden the creditor with producing evidence of compliance with industry
terms since there was no evidence in the record that the industry practices differed from
those of the parties. Id. Thus, the Sixth Circuit stands with the Eighth Circuit in
recently rejecting prior decisions supporting the party-focused approach.
152. Fred Hawes, 957 F.2d at 239.
153. Id. at 245. The Fred Hawes court distinguished the subsection (C) evidentiary
requirements from those imposed under subsection (B) by noting that the latter
subjectively requires proof that the debt and its payment are ordinary in relation to other
business dealings between that creditor and that debtor. Id. at 244. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit noted that with respect to subsection (B), courts "eschew precise legal tests and
instead engage in a fact-specific analysis." Id. Courts consider such factors as timing,
amount of payment, and circumstances surrounding payment. Id. (citing Yurika Foods
Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. (In re Yurika Foods Corp.), 888 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.
1989)).
154. Id. at 245-46. "[I]n looking at industry standards, a court may also refer to the
manner in which the parties conduct their business with other, unrelated parties. This
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proffered testimony concerning industry 5terms did not satisfy section
547(c)(2)(C)'s high evidentiary burden.1
D. Unique Definition of "OrdinaryBusiness Terms"
The Tenth Circuit flatly refused to endorse specifically either the
party-focused view or the industry-terms view. Instead, it formulated
its own definition of "ordinary business terms."' 5 6 In In re Meredith
57
Hoffman Partners,1
the Tenth Circuit discussed two possible interpretations."' Under the reading it credited to the Eighth Circuit,
"ordinary business terms" would mean terms that creditors in similar
situations commonly use, even if the situation is extraordinary. 5 9 The
court rejected this interpretation, however, in favor of its own
definition.' 60
According to the definition developed by the Tenth Circuit in
Meredith Hoffman, the phrase "ordinary business terms" means those
terms that are used in usual or ordinary situations or during "normal
financing relations. ' ' 16 The court weakly attempted to clarify this
definition by further stating that ordinary business terms are "the kinds
of terms that creditors and162 debtors use in ordinary circumstances,
when debtors are healthy."'
E. Flexible Use of the Industry-Terms Analysis
Some circuits have created more flexible industry-terms standards in
defining "ordinary business terms." These flexible standards broaden
the range of applicable industries from which to determine ordinarevidence alone, however, is insufficient to prove 'ordinary business terms' by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 246 n.7. The creditor in Fred Hawes had argued
against having to introduce evidence of similar and independent dealings between the
debtor and other creditors. Id. at 245-46. The Fred Hawes creditor contended that
evidence of its own dealings with its other-approximately 1500-debtors should
satisfy the industry standard requirement. Id. at 245. Nevertheless, the court found this
evidence insufficient under § 547(c)(2)(C), even though the payment terms at issue were
similar to those used between the creditor and its other subcontractor-debtors. Id. at
246.
155. id. (finding the testimony by the creditor's president concerning the industry
terms to lack objectivity, credibility, and reliability).
156. See Clark v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Meredith Hoffman Partners), 12
F.3d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2677 (1994).
157. Id. at 1549.
158. Id. at 1553.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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iness, or allow greater departures from industry termsbased on the
length of the parties' relationship.
For example, the Seventh Circuit defines "ordinary business terms"
as "the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which firms
similar in some general way to the creditor in question engage, and that
only dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range should
extraordinary and therefore outside the scope of subsection
be deemed
63
c."'

Judge Posner endorsed this flexible "industry terms" view in In re
Tolona Pizza Products Corp.,'64 where he concluded that a strict use
of "industry terms" would impose major difficulties on creditors in
meeting their evidentiary burdens.' 61 For instance, he noted that
creditors may face almost impossible evidentiary burdens in attempting
to define what the relevant industry is, or, if there is more than one
industry, which'66industry's terms should serve as the benchmark for
"ordinariness."
Moreover, the Tolona decision noted how variances
in billing practices even within an industry could make it difficult to
satisfy the "industry terms" evidentiary requirement.' 67
The Tolona standard served as the starting point for the Third
Circuit's analysis in In re Molded Acoustical Productions,Inc. 68 The
Molded court adopted a modified Tolona standard that allowed for
even greater flexibility in meeting the industry terms evidentiary
burden.' 69 While crediting the Seventh Circuit with "the best
rendering of the text of § 547(c)(2)(C)" so far, the Molded court
opined that merely relaxing the breadth of the term "industry" was not
enough to ameliorate the evidentiary burdens imposed by an industryterms standard. 70 Thus, the court modified the Tolona standard by
163. In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. In Tolona, the debtor was a maker of pizza who issued checks to its suppliercreditor during the preference period. Id. at 1031.
165. See id. at 1032-33.
166. Id. at 1033.
167. Id. Judge Posner candidly stated:
Not only is it difficult to identify the industry whose norm shall govern (is it,
here, the sale of sausages to makers of pizza? The sale of sausages to anyone?
The sale of anything to makers of pizza?), but there can be great variance in
billing practices within an industry.
Id.
168. Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 1994).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 224. The court pointed out several problems presented by the "industry
terms" evidentiary standard including: (1) the difficulty in defining the standard when
there are several firms in the industry; (2) the possibility that a party may settle
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calling for an analysis of the duration of the parties' relationship.' 7 '
Under the Molded test, parties with a long and consistent pattern of
dealing would be allowed to depart substantially from the so-called
"industry terms."' 7 2 Again, looking at the historical dealings between
the parties, this court essentially created a hybrid standard comprised
of both the party-focused and the industry-terms approach.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the face of sparse legislative history and confusion among the
circuits, courts are still left with the following question: Under the
ordinary-course-of-business exception, is it mandatory that a creditor
introduce independent evidence that its business terms are consistent
with industry terms in order to satisfy section 547(c)(2)(C)? In
deciding this issue, courts should bear in mind whether such a per se
standard is justifiable when a creditor's dealings with a debtor, before
and during the preference period, are consistent and do not show bad
faith.
Perhaps instead of focusing narrowly on the choice between the
party-focused or industry-terms views, courts should focus on how
best to serve the overall policy considerations underlying this defense.
Despite the natural affinity for a bright-line test to use in deciding
summary judgments, a critical analysis of statutory changes, Supreme
Court philosophy, recent circuit court decisions, and practical considerations weigh in favor of a flexible standard.7 3 Thus, even if
industry terms are definable and relevant, creditors should not have to
show conformity therewith in the absence of an inconsistent pattern of
dealing. 7 4 In situations where parties have consistent past dealings,
unfavorably to avoid excessive trial preparation caused by this heightened standard; and
(3) a predicted increase in litigation if defining the "industry terms" becomes a separate
issue. Id. In the court's own language, the task faced by creditors under a pure "industry
terms" approach can be a "formidable if not insurmountable obstacle given the great
variances in billing practices likely to exist within the set of markets or submarkets
which one could plausibly argue comprise the relevant industry." Id.
171. Id. The court preferred this type of analysis over Tolona's relaxed "industry
terms" approach under which the Molded court opined that the parties would merely "end
up bickering over which relaxed definition of 'industry' is the least relaxed, thereby
doing too little to inject certainty and predictability into the law." Id.
172. Id. Despite its praise of the Seventh Circuit's Tolona standard, it stated that it
would "embellish the Seventh Circuit test, however, with a rule that subsection C
countenances a greater departure from that range [of prevailing industry terms] the
longer the pre-insolvency relationship between the debtor and creditor was solidified."
Id. at 220.
173. See infra part IV.A-C.
174. Under the original preference laws, the trustee only had to produce testimony to
show proof of the debtor's insolvency and of the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's
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an analysis of the parties' business terms should sufficiently answer
the question whether the terms at issue are "ordinary."
A. Legislative Policy and Trends Do Not Promote a Strict
Industry-Terms Evidentiary Burden
Certainly, policy objectives underlying preference law should have
some bearing in defining "ordinary business terms." Freedom of contract is perhaps one of the most important principles to bear in mind
when defining these terms. 7 5 As in English Courts that preserved
transactions based on freedom of contract principles,176 current
bankruptcy preference law attempts to uphold normal financial
relations. 77 Just as contract terms may deviate from terms utilized by
parties not involved in the contract, upholding normal financial
relations may occasionally require deviation from strict industry terms.
Thus, a certain amount of variation from industry terms is not necessarily inconsistent with the Code and its English ancestry. It is equally
evident that both congressional policies behind preference lawdeterring the race of diligence and promoting equality
of distribution
7 7 and exception 7 9
avoidance
the
in
role
a
among creditors-play
provisions of this body of law. Indeed, this Comment characterizes
statutory amendments to the Code as efforts to implement one or the
other objective at various times.8 ° Nevertheless, an overall analysis
of these statutory changes reveals that a strict industry-terms view is
not in accord with the specific policy reasons behind the ordinarycourse-of-business exception.
Under the 1898 Act, the reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement
aimed primarily at preventing the race of diligence.' 8 ' By removing
this provision in 1978, Congress exposed more creditors to the
insolvency. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. After these requirements
were expunged, creditors only carried the burden of showing that the preference should
not be avoided. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988). No part of the Code states that any
particular testimony is required. Yet, courts have, in a new trend, seemed to require the
creditor to produce testimony that the terms comply with some industry standard. See
supra parts II.D.2, III.B-E.
175. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 69, 87, 91, and accompanying text.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
179. Id. § 547(c)(2).
180. See supra part II.A.I-2.
181. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. When deterring the race of
diligence is viewed as the primary policy of preference law, an analysis of the parties'
prior dealings should sufficiently demonstrate whether a creditor has attempted to gain
an unfair advantage. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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trustee's avoidance powers."' If this expansion of the scope of
avoidable transfers is considered as strictly an effort to promote the
equality of distribution policy," 3 then the additional industry-terms
84
requirement, which also broadens the scope of avoidable transfers,
is arguably consistent with Congress' earlier efforts.
A review of other enacted provisions of the 1978 Code, however,
weakens this line of reasoning. For, in recognition of the creditor's
difficulty in defending avoidance actions,'85 Congress created the eight
preference exceptions, including the ordinary-course-of-business defense, 186 to protect a special group of trade creditors. 8 7 By making an
exception for these trade creditors, Congress demonstrated that
equality among all creditors is not the only or most important policy
controlling section 547(c)(2). Thus, it is improper for courts to justify
a strict industry-terms requirement under section 547(c)(2)(C) with
reference solely to the equality of distribution policy.
Like the 1978 changes, the 1984 amendments to the Code do not
necessarily support an additional industry-terms evidentiary hurdle
under section 547(c)(2)(C). As stated earlier, some commentators
argue that Congress' refusal to reinstate a reasonable-cause-to-believe
requirement 188 in 1984, signified Congress' aim to promote equality of
distribution among creditors. 89 A more plausible argument, however,
is that in not reinstating this knowledge requirement, Congress sought
to refrain from imposing unworkable evidentiary burdens on the
trustee."9 Congress demonstrated this partiality for lighter evidentiary
182. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. Essentially, as more transfers
are avoided more transfers will be returned to the common pool that will be divided
equally among like-classed creditors when the bankrupt estate is distributed.
184. The scope is broadened as a consequence of more transfers being avoided each
time a creditor fails to produce evidence of compliance with industry standards. See
supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (discussing that several monthly
transactions fell prey to avoidance without the reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
187. See supra notes 67-68, 78, and accompanying text. Furthermore, by removing
the 45-day rule, see supra note 72 and accompanying text, Congress' intent to protect
trade creditors with longer cycles is clear. See Countryman, supra note 32, at 769.
188. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the House and Senate
proposals to reinstate this requirement). As previously noted, these proposals suggest
Congress' recognition of the need to further protect certain trade creditors. See supra
notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
189. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96.
190. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96 n.91 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138-39, which explains
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requirements by creating the presumption of insolvency in the ninety
days preceding the bankruptcy petition.19'
Thus, requiring strict compliance with industry terms is inconsistent
with former congressional attempts to lessen evidentiary burdens
under the Code. Furthermore, it can be argued that Congress would
oppose the industry-terms evidentiary requirement since it is proving
too difficult to meet 92 and is sparking a new breed of litigation. 93
B. The Supreme Court Would ProbablyReject an
"Industry-Terms" Requirement
According to the Supreme Court, deterring the race of diligence is
the primary policy underlying preference law.' 94 Wolas' statement that
equality of distribution is not more important than the deterrence
policy' 95 provides guidance for interpreting section 547(c)(2)(C)'s
"ordinary business terms." This statement suggests that the Court
would not endorse an overinclusive 96 evidentiary requirement that
increases the scope of avoided transactions purely for the sake of
equality of distribution. Rather, Wolas indicates that the Court stands
the difficulty imposed on trustees under the 1898 Act); supra notes 60, 66, and
accompanying text.
191. See Broome, supra note 32, at 96 n.91 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 178 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138-39, which explains
the difficulty imposed on trustees under the 1898 Act).
192. See, e.g., Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp., (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d
239, 246 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding lengthy testimony regarding industry terms to be
nevertheless insufficient due to the court's opinion that it lacked reliability).
193. See Youthland, Inc. v. Sunshine Girls of Fla., Inc. (In re Youthland, Inc.), 160
B.R. 311 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993). This bankruptcy decision supports the assertion
that the new "industry terms" compliance cases will only shift the litigation to a new
arena discussing which industry applies, rather than reducing litigation. Id. In
Youthland, the creditor, a clothing manufacturer who sought to except an alleged
preferential transfer, introduced evidence of how the payment terms were consistent with
terms used in the apparel industry. Id. The court denied the request holding that the
relevant industry terms to be examined with respect to the debtor, a retailer, was the
children's apparel industry terms. Id. at 315-16.
194. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991). Arguably, analyzing the
parties' prior dealings would be sufficient to determine whether, at the time of the
alleged preferential payment, the creditor was trying to join the race of diligence in order
to opt out of the common-pool bankruptcy proceedings.
195. Id. at 161.
196. Such an evidentiary burden is overinclusive because it allows creditors with
insufficient industry-terms evidence to suffer financially the avoidance of transfer--even
if the terms of the payment were not unusual, or were entirely consistent with the prior
payment terms used between the parties. Thus, since the industry-terms evidentiary
burden potentially results in avoidance of routine business transfers, the requirement is
inconsistent with Congress' aim to uphold "normal financial relations." See supra
notes 69, 87, 91, and accompanying text.
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behind a more individualistic approach in determining whether a
creditor has entered the race of diligence.' 97
The Court's history of using a textual rather than an interpretative
analysis when construing bankruptcy provisions further supports this
inference.' 98 For, just as Wolas refused to exclude long-term debt
from ordinary course protection where the statute did not explicitly exclude it,1 99 the Court would likely impose the "industry terms"
evidentiary requirement only if such a requirement could be gleaned
from the plain-meaning of the statute. 20° Because of the absence of the
words "in the industry" after the words "ordinary business terms" in
section 547(c)(2)(C), the Court, using a plain-language or textualism
analysis, would conclude that the statutory language does not support
mandating an industry-terms evidentiary burden. Thus, the Court's
rulings and interpretative philosophy together undercut the argument
that section 547(c)(2)(C) necessarily requires a creditor to introduce
evidence of strict compliance with industry terms.
.C. A HeightenedEvidentiaryRequirement is Unnecessary
Despite the above conclusion that a mandated industry-terms
evidentiary requirement is not supported by Congress or the Supreme
Court, courts may occasionally still need an added element of objectivity to evaluate efficiently when to provide creditors with section
547(c)(2)(C) protection. To understand how this objectivity may be
sufficiently established by analyzing the parties' prior dealings,
consider the following hypothetical.
Suppose that despite the existence of a contract calling for payments
within thirty days, a particular debtor has consistently, over a five-year
period, paid its supplier-creditor within sixty days of the invoice
date. 20 ' Also imagine that many suppliers in this industry would
197. By looking only at the parties' prior dealings, only those unusual actions with
respect to the parties' past business practices would be avoided. See supra notes 47-55
and accompanying text.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100 (discussing how under its "plainmeaning" analysis, the Court will not limit a statutory provision in the absence of
explicit qualifying language).
199. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
200. If Congress wanted to require creditors to introduce industry-terms evidence to
prove § 547(c)(2)(C) applies, it could have simply inserted the word "industry" between
"ordinary business" and "terms" or appended "in the industry" after "ordinary business
terms." Thus, the fact that Congress chose only the words "according to ordinary
business terms" for § 547(c)(2)(C) arguably demonstrates Congress' intent to allow for
flexibility.
201. Such lenient creditor behavior is more comprehensible when framed in a
particular context. Thus, for purposes of this hypothetical, further imagine that the
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accept payments as being "timely" if paid within forty-five days of the
invoice date. Now, it so happens that the last payment received by the
creditor was transferred during the last ninety days before the debtor
declared bankruptcy, and thus is subject to the trustee's avoidance
powers. 2°2 The creditor defends against the avoidance action, urging
that the ordinary-course-of-business defense protects the payment.
As evidence that the payment was not unusual or an effort to enforce
its claim unfairly, the creditor, through the company's president,
introduces testimony that it ordinarily accepted that debtor's late payments, even though the contract required payment in thirty days. The
president further testifies that the creditor's leniency toward this
particular debtor was due to the importance of the business and the
otherwise good relationship between the parties over a number of
years. The creditor's only testimony regarding industry terms was that
payments received within
forty-five days were normally accepted as
20 3
industry.
the
in
"timely"
Where courts require strict compliance with industry standards, this
evidence is insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden imposed by
section 547(c)(2)(C). 20 4 The problem with this result is that by
requiring the payment to have been received within forty-five days, a
court necessarily would upset the normal business relations between
the parties, in an effort to treat like-class creditors equally. Unfortunately, this court would fail to realize that the particular creditor is
not in the same class with other creditors, but was among a special
group of creditors who gave the debtor more favorable credit terms,
not because of a desire to bypass the bankruptcy rules, but because of
the importance and stability of the long-term relationship between the
parties. 205
more tolerant creditor resides in the same small town as the debtor and has reason to
believe that the debtor's business will be an ultimate success despite initial cash-flow
problems. Also imagine that a more demanding creditor is located in a distant city and
has no knowledge of the debtor's business acumen. Without such reassurance, the bigcity creditor would understandably insist on strict payment terms.
202. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
203. This hypothetical is based, in part, on the factual situation in Tolona where the
lower court, under a strict "industry terms" analysis, found that similar testimony failed
to prove objectively the payment was not a preference. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods.
Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1993) and portions of transcript quoted in Brief
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 14, Tolona, 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-3386).
204. See Tolona, 3 F.3d at 1033 (arguing that the law should not create a single set of
rules to decide what is normal in the industry).
205. Considering the additional facts discussed in note 201, this result sends a
message to the small-town creditor to be as antagonistic as big-city creditors with
respect to credit terms, or risk the trustee's avoidance power. Although this topic is
beyond the scope of this Comment, such an atmosphere would probably hinder new
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An even more disturbing situation would develop where the
industry terms and party-established extra-contractual terms are
transposed. In other words, suppose that the industry accepted any
payment received within sixty days, while the creditor only introduced
testimony that it accepted payments if made and received within fortyfive days. Under a strict reading of the industry-terms evidentiary
requirement, a creditor would fail to satisfy the burden of section
547(c)(2) since the testimony fails to show that the payment terms
were consistent with those of the industry. In this situation, a strict
industry-terms requirement penalizes a creditor who insists on a
prompt payment plan, while rewarding less diligent payment practices.
Even though the creditor has not exhibited unusual behavior, nor
entered the race of diligence, the creditor in this example is penalized
solely for his lack of sufficient industry-terms testimony. Thus,
adopting such an inflexible rule in similar contexts fails to acknowledge the realities of modem business practices.
D. Use of "Industry-Terms" Analysis Should Be Limited
There are cases, however, where an evaluation of industry terms
proves helpful. The obvious example is where no prior course of
dealing exists between the parties. For such first-time transactions,
requiring industry-terms evidence is reasonable in order to determine
objectively whether the creditor was entering the race of diligence.
Moreover, where the parties' established practice falls so far outside
the accepted industry standard, an analysis of industry terms is
warranted. In such a case, the parties' conduct, however consistent it
has been, is likely to be viewed as so unusual that it must have been an
effort to position the creditor unfairly in an eventual bankruptcy proceeding. In Tolona,2 °6 Judge Posner described such a special
situation, noting that if a shrewd creditor knows, a priori, that consistent prior dealings are protected from avoidance actions, the creditor
could work out a special deal with the debtor, before the preference
period, of accepting late payments. 0 7 The theory is that by establishing this late payment history, the creditor would get more favorable
treatment in the event of bankruptcy. 28
Attempting to deter such extraordinariness, some circuits have
adopted the per se industry-terms evidentiary requirement under
business relationships and could jeopardize the flow of commerce that could be fostered
within the community by more cooperative debtor-creditor relationships.
206. 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).
207. See id. at 1032.
208. See id.
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section 547(c)(2)(C). 209 Obviously, agreeing on a late-payment policy
prior to commencement of the parties' relationship is beyond the range
of normal financial dealings.210 In such a case, an analysis of the
parties' consistent late dealings would fail to uncover this fraudulent
behavior and thus would fail to deter the race of diligence.21' Thus,
the call for industry-terms evidence is reasonable in such specialized
cases in order to protect against such unusual deals between the
parties. 212 As explained by Judge Posner in Tolona, the industryterms requirement would reassure creditors that the debtor has not
entered into some unusual payment scheme devised to favor a
particular creditor unfairly upon an eventual bankruptcy.213
Nevertheless, it remains unanswered how creditors must satisfy this
evidentiary burden. Whose industry terms govern? How do courts
account for variances within an industry's billing practice? What if
there is more than one relevant industry, each of which uses different
payment terms? In recognition of the difficulties created by this
evidentiary standard,21 4 the Tolona court stated that "the law should
not push businessmen to agree upon a single set of billing practices. 21 5 Instead, Tolona advises courts to find that payment terms are
"ordinary" if they are consistent with a range of terms appearing in
209. As previously discussed in part IIl, several circuits, possibly a majority, have
recently endorsed what used to be the minority view. See, e.g., Jones v. United Sav. and
Loan Ass'n (In re U.S.A. Inns of Eureka Springs, Ark., Inc.), 9 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir.
1993); Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d 239, 245
(6th Cir. 1992); Bell Flavor and Fragrances, Inc. v. Andrew (In re Loretto Winery, Ltd.),
107 B.R. 707, 709 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989). Despite this trend to endorse the industryterms view, this Comment maintains that a per se application of this view is not
consistent with the policies underlying bankruptcy preference law.
210. This type of pre-arranged late payment policy is distinguishable from that in
which the payment terms are modified over time by late-paying conduct. When viewed
in retrospect, as in the latter case, the resulting payment terms are less likely to be
unusual or beyond the terms of acceptable business practices.
211. See supra part IV.C.
212. See Tolona, 3 F.3d at 1032.
213. Id. Posner's exact language is instructive:
The second possible function of . . . [subsection Cl is to allay the concerns of
creditors that one or more of their number may have worked out a special deal
with the debtor, before the preference period, designed to put that creditor
ahead of the others in the event of bankruptcy. It may seem odd that allowing
late payments from a debtor would be a way for a creditor to make himself more
rather than less assured of repayment. But such a creditor does have an
advantage during the preference period, because he can receive late payments
then and they will still be in the ordinary course of business for him and his
debtor.
Id.
214. See id. at 1033.
215. Id.
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general billing practices. 1 6
Despite this insightful analysis, Tolona still failed to instruct
creditors specifically on the best way to structure their dealings so as to
protect themselves from a trustee's avoidance powers. 1 7 Even courts
applying Tolona's watered-down industry-terms approach will
continue to render decisions based on a case-by-case basis. 18
One way to provide some predictability for creditors is to adopt the
modified Tolona view as endorsed by the Molded court.2 19 Molded
allows a departure from industry terms if the terms of the preferential
payment are consistent with terms used in the creditor's prior dealings
with the debtor or with similarly-situated debtors. 220 Hence, Molded
does not impose a heightened evidentiary burden on creditors who do
not utilize the type of unusual terms associated with secret or selfinterested deals.22 ' On the other hand, creditors who have worked out
special deals with debtors are on notice that a court will require the
terms at issue to be similar to industry terms. Although creditors
entering into special deals will continue to face inconsistent, factspecific determinations of whether their evidence meets the industryterms evidentiary threshold, the unusual or secretive nature of such
transactions justifies the burden.
V. PROPOSAL

In analyzing section 547(c)(2)(C), courts have historically chosen
between two prevailing views as to what is meant by "ordinary
business terms. 222 These two views are often characterized as
216. Id. The court explained: "[lOinly dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that
broad range should be deemed extraordinary and therefore beyond the scope of
subsection C." Id.
217. The phrase "general billing practice" is vague and ambiguous. Consequently, it
would be difficult for the creditor to determine, without the benefit of hindsight, whether
the credit terms are in general agreement with general business practices.
218. In other words, the Tolona decision still does not provide predictability for
concerned creditors since courts may disagree on whether the watered-down industryterms requirement is met. Indeed, Judge Posner drew a strong dissent from Judge Flaum
who, although agreeing with the standard, disagreed on whether the standard had been
met by the evidence. Id. at 1033-34 (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority
that under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) Rose was required to show that Tolona's payments
had been made in accordance with the ordinary business terms of the industry .... I
respectfully dissent, however, because I cannot conclude that Rose in fact made the
requisite showing.").
219. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1994).
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
222. See supra parts II-III.
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comprising a subjective, 2party-focused
standard or an objective,
industry-focused standard.22 Recently, many courts have required the
payment terms at issue to be both subjectively and objectively ordinary. 224 According to these courts, a party must offer evidence that
the terms at issue comply
with an industry standard in order to satisfy
225
section 547(c)(2)(C).
These courts fail to recognize that objectivity may be established
between two parties by other means, such as by examining the parties'
consistent and long-term prior course of dealings.226 Thus, for these
courts, even evidence that two parties have consistently used the same
payment terms over the course of several transactions will not
necessarily establish that the payment terms are "ordinary. 227 For
other courts, however, consistent prior dealings sufficiently satisfy the
evidentiary burdens associated with section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary
business terms" element of the ordinary-course-of-business defense. 228 These inconsistent outcomes among the circuits leave
creditors in a quandary over whether their current transactions would
be protected from the trustee's avoidance powers upon a debtor's
eventual bankruptcy.
Courts must come to an understanding of what they will accept as
"ordinary business terms" so that creditors can extend credit without
worrying over whether payments would survive a preference attack.
For these creditors, predictability is of great importance. Without it,
they may be forced
to withdraw from this market and to extend only
229
secured credit.
Therefore, when a court determines whether a payment is made
according to "ordinary terms" under section 547(c)(2)(C), a court
should adopt the following approach. The court should not require
evidence of industry terms unless the parties have no prior course of
dealings or the facts and circumstances indicate that the parties
attempted to thwart the underlying policies of preference law by

223.

See supra parts II-III.

224. See supra part III.
225. See, e.g., Logan v. Basic Distrib. Corp. (In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc.), 957 F.2d
239, 246 (6th Cir. 1992).
226. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the objectivity that is
often ignored in the party-focused view).
227. See Fred Hawes, 957 F.2d at 245.
228. Molded, 18 F.3d at 224.
229. A discussion of priorities of secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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entering the race of diligence. 30 Thus, where the terms are so unusual
that the only reasonable explanation is that the parties attempted to
enter the race of diligence, even the parties' consistent past practices
should fail to satisfy section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary terms"
requirement.231
Even in these circumstances, however, a court should allow the
creditor to prove that the debtor made the alleged preferential transfer
according to terms used in either a specific industry, or according to
general billing practices. Upon such proof, a court should not allow
the trustee to avoid the transfer. In evaluating the creditor's proffered
evidence, a court should follow the reasoning set forth in Tolona and
Molded.23 2 Under these cases, the creditor need not introduce
evidence that the payment terms at issue complied with a specific
industry's terms. Rather, a creditor may prevail by proving that the
terms of the transfer were consistent with non-industry specific general
billing practices.2 3' Absent evidence that a creditor entered the race of
diligence, or where parties have a history of prior dealings, a court
should neither require the creditor to introduce specific "industry
terms" nor general billing practices evidence. Under these
circumstances, imposing such an evidentiary burden is inconsistent
with legislative and judicial trends and policy. Instead, courts should
require creditors to satisfy section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary terms" by
introducing evidences that demonstrates the parties' consistent prior
course of dealing.234
In implementing this proposal, a court should use the following
evidentiary framework. Initially, the trustee has the burden of
showing a lack of prior dealings between the parties or that the
creditor's actions were so extraordinary as to create the inference that
the creditor was trying to win the race of diligence. Once the trustee
meets the initial burden, the creditor must come forward with evidence
230. For instance, where the terms at issue are truly extraordinary or where there is no
prior course of dealing, courts should require evidence of industry terms. See supra part
IV.D.
231. Seesupra part IV.
232. See supra part III.E.
233. See Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp. v. Rose Packing Co., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th
Cir. 1993). Such a standard could be met, for instance, by the creditor's evidence
showing that the payment terms at issue in the preference action were similar to those
used between this creditor and other debtors, between the debtor at issue and other
creditors, or between any other creditors and debtors, unrelated to the particular debtor
and creditor at issue. The court should evaluate the weight of the evidence of compliance
with general billing practices, taking into account the credibility of the witnesses and
reliability of the information presented.
234. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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that the payment terms complied with terms used in the "industry." In
evaluating whether the terms complied with industry terms, a court
need only find that the terms were consistent with general billing
practices rather than those of a specific industry. If a court finds the
terms were consistent with general billing practices, it should disallow
the trustee's avoidance action. If, however, a court finds the terms
were inconsistent with general billing practices, the payment should be
avoided.
By following this approach, the judicial system may slowly help
clarify the meaning of section 547(c)(2)(C)'s "ordinary business
terms" circuit by circuit. Yet, this circuit by circuit approach has,
however, created confusion among the circuits. Therefore, Congress
should step in and revise section 547(c)(2)(C) or provide official
comments explaining this vague subsection. Unfortunately, Congress
failed to address or to change the language in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) in
the recent amendments to the Code made pursuant to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994.
Hopefully, Congress will not overlook the section 547(c)(2)(C)
problem the next time it passes bankruptcy legislation. When that time
comes again, Congress should encourage an interpretation of section
547(c)(2)(C) that is most consistent with the primary purposes
underlying preference law.2 35 This proposal suggests a workable
framework to be used in interpreting section 547(c)(2)(C) "ordinary
terms" requirement. Similar guidance by Congress would be highly
appreciated by creditors, commentators, and courts forced to deal with
the current ambiguity of section 547(c)(2)(C).
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether to apply the ordinary-course-of-business
exception, courts should interpret section 547(c)(2)(C) in a manner
consistent with preference policy objectives. The Supreme Court has
declared that preventing unusual credit transactions to deter the race of
diligence is the primary purpose behind preference law.236 Thus,
courts should not automatically impose a strict "industry-terms"
requirement, since this would cause transfers to be avoided arbitrarily,
whether or not the creditor was acting in a self-interested manner.
Instead, courts should determine whether the terms at issue are con235. See supra parts II-IV.
236. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991). The Court also noted that
equality of distribution would result as a consequence of promoting the primary policy of
deterring the race of diligence. Id. at 162.
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sistent with the primary policy of preference law-deterring the race of
diligence-by evaluating the parties' prior course of dealings.
Where there are no prior dealings, or where the prior terms used
between the parties are truly extraordinary, then the court must impose
an added evidentiary burden. Under these circumstances, a court
should uphold the trustee's avoidance action, unless the creditor
proves that the terms of the preferential payment were consistent with
general billing practices.
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